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In his influential article “Moderate Moralism” (1996), Noël Carroll ob-
serves how from the different traditions of aesthetics, analytic aesthetics 
has been the slowest to devote more substantial attention to the rela-
tionship between art and morality. To bring moral concerns to bear on 
issues of criticism and evaluation of art was considered illegitimate, as 
it was thought to move attention from the art object itself to something 
ultimately irrelevant to a proper evaluation of its aesthetic value. Much 
has changed since Carroll’s article, for the question of the effect of an 
artwork’s moral value and content, on its aesthetic value as a whole, has 
received growing attention and the discussion revolving around it has 
become one of the liveliest ones in current analytic aesthetics with dif-
ferent compelling positions. One important strand of Elisabeth Schelle-
kens’s book Aesthetics and Morality tackles this discussion and it offers 
a nice overview of the debate and the crux issues it involves. Besides 
presenting an analysis of the discussion initiated by Carroll’s article, 
other major issues Schellekens covers concern for example the overlap 
between aesthetics and ethics as fields of enquiry, the values of art, the 
role of aesthetic experience in developing our sense of morality and in 
building a meaningful life, as well as the relationship between beauty, 
virtuousness, and the morally good. Especially in this last case, Schelle-
kens’s account has a strong historical emphasis, discussing the ideas of 
Plato, Reid, Hume and especially Kant’s view of beauty as the symbol 
of morality, but she also quickly points out some possible consequences 
that ideas rising from analytic aesthetics may have on how the relation-
ship between beauty and the morally good should be understood.
For Schellekens, aesthetics and ethics are closely related fields already 
on a fundamental level, in that for both of them the notion of value occu-
pies center stage. Hence, similar metaphysical issues, for example, about 
the reality of the values these fields examine, that is, aesthetic and moral, 
rise in both. Moreover, some of the questions they address intersect with 
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the same aspects of human life, particularly those regarding how one 
should live, what sorts of goals one should consider worth pursuing, and 
the kind of relationship one ought to build to one’s neighbors to ensure 
a meaningful life. Given these apparent similarities between aesthetics 
and ethics, Schellekens asks whether the attempt to distinguish these 
two branches of philosophy as distinct fields of philosophy is even mean-
ingful. She refers to Wittgenstein’s famous statement from the Tractatus 
according to which “Ethics and Aesthetics are one and the same” and 
uses it as a backdrop for her own exposition of the subject without, how-
ever, offering that detailed a reading of what Wittgenstein might mean 
by this claim in the transcendental context of the Tractatus. The view of 
the relationship of aesthetics and ethics Schellekens ultimately arrives 
at in the book is much more modest than what she takes Wittgenstein’s 
view to be. Indeed, there are some evident connections between these 
realms, but it appears differently in different contexts, taking different 
levels of strength, and it needs to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
Schellekens begins her investigation of the relationship between aes-
thetics and ethics by tracking the limits of the aesthetic. She goes through 
two influential accounts of aesthetic experience, Monroe Beardsley’s 
view of aesthetic experience as a unified, intensive, and complex men-
tal state and Jerome Stolnitz’s aesthetic attitude theory, however, finding 
them both unsatisfactory, at least as attempts to nail down the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of aesthetic experience. However, Schellekens 
thinks there is a positive side to these failures. That aesthetic experience 
cannot be neatly demarcated from other kinds of experience and that 
the elements that have an effect on it cannot be exhaustively singled out 
in her view actually provides a fruitful basis for exploring the ways in 
which the realms of the aesthetic and that of the moral, might intersect 
and interact with one another.
Despite finding it impossible to list definitive criteria for aesthetic ex-
perience, Schellekens nevertheless believes that it is tightly connected 
with the notion of aesthetic value. Aesthetic experience is primarily the 
experience of aesthetic value. Schellekens hopes that by extracting this 
variant of value, and by investigating the position other kinds of value 
have within the realm of art, we will achieve a better grasp of how aes-
thetic value is related to them, particularly to moral value. Schellekens 
examines the value of art by a fairly traditional set of concepts. Art can 
have both intrinsic and extrinsic value, as well as be valuable instrumen-
tally. Intrinsic value is something a thing possesses in virtue of its own 
qualities alone, while extrinsic value is explained in terms of the value a 
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thing acquires as a result of the relationships it bears to other objects in 
the universe. Art can be valuable in many ways and in many contexts. It 
can, for example, enhance religious feeling (religious value) unite society 
(societal value), and reveal facts about the past (historical value). All of 
these variants are for Schellekens examples of the kinds of extrinsic val-
ue artworks may possess. The significant amount of the extrinsic values 
that may be attributed to art does not exclude art from having purely in-
trinsic value, that is, value that it possesses for its own sake. Schellekens 
locates the source of this value to the experience art affords. 
However, she does not believe that intrinsic value in the case of art 
can be explained in purely aesthetic terms. Other sorts of values can 
come into play in constituting an artwork’s intrinsic value, that is, the 
experience it affords. In Schellekens’s view, moral value in particular has 
an important role in this, for the moral point of view a work provides to 
its characters and their actions has a direct effect on how we experience 
the work. The moral value of a work is thus different in kind compared 
to its possible historical value, for only the former has a bearing on our 
experience of the work and, thus, unlike historical value, moral value is 
intrinsic to art. Schellekens also introduces the notion of artistic value 
to explain cases where the value of an artwork cannot be properly ac-
counted for in purely aesthetic terms. This is the case, for example, with 
most avant-garde art.
Schellekens offers a more detailed examination of the effect a work’s 
moral content can have on its aesthetic and artistic value by going 
through the different positions that have been presented in debates on 
the issue within analytic aesthetics – autonomism, moderate moralism, 
ethicism, sophisticated aestheticism, immoralism, and most moderate 
moralism – as well as discussing some historical theories, mainly Bell’s 
formalism and Tolstoy’s moralist theory of art, that have a direct bearing 
on the issue. As noted, the position Carroll supports, that is, “moderate 
moralism” has been an important initiator in the current debate. Carroll 
famously holds that in some cases the moral value of a work can have an 
effect on its aesthetic value. This is particularly so in cases where a work 
prescribes an attitude from the audience to its characters and events 
portrayed in the work that the audience cannot take on because of the 
morally reprehensible character of the proposed outlook. In these kinds 
of cases, the moderate moralist claims, the reprehensible moral content 
of the work will reduce the work’s aesthetic value. This, of course, is 
presumed to work the other way around as well: if a work prescribes a 
morally praiseworthy attitude, this will increase the aesthetic value of 
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the work, though it must be said that usually moderate moralists seem 
to be more concerned with pointing out how the morally reprehensible 
content diminishes an artwork’s aesthetic value.
According to Schellekens, there is a set of artworks that occupy a par-
ticularly vital position with respect to the question of the relevance of 
an artwork’s moral outlook to its overall value as art. These are cases 
where a work seems worthy of artistic praise because of the morally rep-
rehensible outlook it prescribes audience members to take on. She lists 
some concrete instances of artworks in which this arguably is the case, 
in other words, in which, the work’s artistic success is explained by the 
work’s morally reprehensible character. These examples fly in the face of 
the moralist’s view of the effect of a work’s moral reprehensibility on its 
aesthetic value.  
Schellekens concentrates especially on Mathew Kieran’s assessment 
of the relevance of these kinds of cases for the debate. However, her 
own standing on the issue does not become fully apparent. In fact, it ap-
pears a bit wary, for she seems to find something true in both moderate 
moralism and immoralism. Schellekens’ discussion of immoral art and 
the place she sees it occupying in the debate suggests that she agrees 
with the immoralist’s claim that an immoral character of an artwork 
can enhance its value as art. But on the other hand especially her use 
of the example of Leni Riefenstahl’s The Triumph of the Will, one of 
the main examples the moralists have cited in favor of their position, 
throughout the book gives the impression that she also thinks the mod-
erate moralist manages to capture some important aspect of our appre-
ciation of art, namely that an artwork’s reprehensible moral content, 
in this case the celebration of Nazi ideology, can have a negative effect 
on an artwork’s aesthetic value. In the preface to the book, Schellekens 
remarks how it is not the goal of the book to present any specific theory 
as absolutely true. Nowhere is this intention more apparent than in the 
part focusing on the moralist debate of analytic aesthetics and it seems 
that Schellekens’s outlook on the debate is similar to Daniel Jacobsen’s, 
who is quite skeptical of the possibility of providing a fully-fledged 
single theory of the relationship between aesthetic and moral value. 
In this instance, ethics and aesthetics do not appear to be one and the 
same, but to exhibit crisscrossing influences on each other.
One thing that is clear is that Schellekens does not agree with any form 
of autonomism or aestheticism, not even of the sophisticated kind, that 
sees no essential connection between moral and aesthetic value. For her, 
the evidence arising from immoral art, and from cases like Riefenstahl’s 
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Triumph of the Will, is so strong that the existence of such a connection 
just cannot be denied. The problem is how it should be accounted for. 
However, it is a shame that Schellekens does not consider the version of 
autonomism which has been presented in the current debate, though she 
does mention the article in the bibliography of the book,1 instead present-
ing Bell’s formalism as the main representative of an autonomist view of 
the relationship between moral and aesthetic value. The problems that 
have been raised against autonomism may indeed be insurmountable, 
but much more effort has been put on meeting them than Schellekens’ 
investigation implies. 
The third part of the book addresses the relationship between ethics 
and aesthetics from the perspective of art’s and aesthetic experience’s 
capacity to function in moral education as a means to an improved 
moral life. This discussion is set up in the final chapter of the previous 
part of the book with an illuminating discussion of what it might mean 
for an artwork to convey moral knowledge. Some of the reflections 
found on the educational power of art and the aesthetic are developed 
on the basis of an assumption seeming to imply that ethics and aesthet-
ics are indeed one and the same. Aesthetic experience’s, or to be more 
exact, beauty’s ability to improve moral perception serves for some as a 
sign that beauty and moral goodness are, in fact, tied to each other on a 
metaphysical level. They are, in other words, two instances of the same 
thing. Beauty of a soul is a mark of a virtuous person and the love of 
beauty is identical with the love of the good. In the history of aesthet-
ics, Plato and Thomas Reid can be singled out as holding some variant 
of this view, but it also receives a contemporary expression in Colin 
McGinn’s aesthetic theory of virtue.
Schellekens’s attitude towards these conceptions of beauty and moral 
goodness seems to be a bit of two minds. She believes they embody some 
important truths, but simultaneously Schellekens finds the metaphysical 
underpinnings of these views objectionable. For her, they are primary 
examples of views where ethics and aesthetics are considered to be one 
and the same, and this of course squares rather badly with Schellekens’ 
skeptical attitude towards universal conceptions of that relationship. In 
other words, the views emphasizing the essential connection between 
beauty and moral goodness are right in drawing attention to the positive 
impact that art and other aesthetic objects may have on moral percep-
tion and on moral life, but the metaphysical package they bring into the 
explanation just needs to be dropped. The relationship between the aes-
thetic and the moral should in this case be understood in more pragmatic 
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terms. Aesthetic and moral perception are united in that they require the 
utilization of similar mental capacities and Schellekens rounds up her 
investigation of this topic with a nice discussion of the role the imagina-
tion occupies in both aesthetic and moral life and how they can mutually 
reinforce one another. 
It is hard to find anything that bad to say about Schellekens’ book. It 
provides a succinct overview of the issues it addresses and will be useful 
reading material to anybody wanting a concise introduction to them. 
A lot has, of course, been said about the relationship of aesthetics and 
ethics in other traditions of philosophy, but perhaps it was wise for the 
sake of unity to concentrate on the analytic tradition with some informa-
tive sidesteps to the history of aesthetics. 
The only thing I had a hard time figuring out is the intended audience 
of the book. I doubt it can be aimed at advanced scholars in the field of 
aesthetics, as the book does not introduce views a person well-read in the 
subject matter of the book would not know beforehand and neither does 
it provide detailed novel answers to existing problems. For example, af-
ter her analysis of the moralist debate in analytic aesthetics, Schellekens 
writes that what is needed now “is a new framework that overcomes the 
limitations of the debate and provides us with fresh spectrum of philo-
sophical alternatives” (91). However, she does very little herself to develop 
such a framework in the book.
Arguably the primary audience of the book is intended to be students 
of philosophy and aesthetics, as well as people with a general interest 
in philosophical questions. The book is written in a highly untechni-
cal style and Schellekens gives explanations of the general terms used 
in the book that are accessible without prior substantial knowledge of 
philosophical concepts. The interpretation that the intended audience of 
the book is wider than mere professional aestheticians, though they will 
surely benefit from reading the book as well, is supported by observing 
the defense of the field of aesthetics Schellekens presents at the begin-
ning of the work. One strand of that defense consists in showing that 
aesthetics is in no way a lesser subject compared to some other fields of 
philosophy such as metaphysics and epistemology, for metaphysical and 
epistemological issues have a direct bearing on questions of aesthetics. 
The second line of skepticism addressed to aesthetics that Schellekens 
raises comes from the practice of art. It accuses aesthetics for reducing a 
rich, complex, and meaningful experience’s affording phenomenon into 
abstract concepts and theories. Schellekens insists that this criticism, too, 
rests on a misconception of the discipline. Aesthetics in no way makes a 
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living organism into a skeleton, but in fact, in her view, a detailed philo-
sophical analysis of the concepts and qualities pertaining to aesthetic 
phenomena will make “our experience of them… considerably richer and 
more rewarding than our pre-philosophical ones” (2). “Philosophical Aes-
thetics is thus the key to not only an adequate theoretical understanding 
of aesthetic value and the phenomena derived from it, but also to a more 
satisfying and worthwhile aesthetic life”, she argues (2). 
Now, it seems that Schellekens believes that a focus on the varied in-
tersections between aesthetics and ethics will help in showing both criti-
cisms of aesthetics she outlines as unfounded. However, I think she suc-
ceeds only in the second case, for there is very little effort in the book to 
connect issues of aesthetics to wider epistemological and metaphysical 
questions, to the issue of realism, for example. There is virtually no ref-
erence to the different ways in which the metaphysics of aesthetic prop-
erties has been conceived in recent literature and how those relate, for 
example, to the issue of supervenience present in the philosophy of mind 
and ethics. Schellekens is indeed right in defending the field of aesthet-
ics against the sorts of criticism she raises, but the defense she herself 
formulates remains rather underdeveloped.
In the second case, however, Schellekens manages to meet her goal. 
The careful examinations of the different ways in which the realms of 
the aesthetic and the moral intersect she presents, succeed in bringing 
out the complexity and richness of the factors having a role in the experi-
ence of art and other aesthetic phenomena. In this respect, Schellekens’ 
book shows that philosophical aesthetics can indeed make invaluable 
contributions to our aesthetic life.
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